Bốn hướng đột phá chính sách nông nghiệp, nông thôn và nông dân trong giai đoạn hiện nay
Không thể phủ nhận những thành tựu mà nền nông nghiệp Việt Nam đã đạt được
trong thời kỳ đổi mới: từ chỗ thiếu đói và khủng hoảng lương thực trong thập kỷ cuối 70
đầu 80 chúng ta vươn lên đủ ăn và trở thành nước đứng thứ nhì thế giới về xuất khẩu gạo,
đứng vào một trong những nước hàng đầu thế giới về xuất khẩu các nông phẩm nhiệt đới
như cà phê, cao su, hạt tiêu, điều và gần đây xuất khẩu thuỷ sản cũng chiếm vị trí cao. Có
được kết quả này là nhờ chính sách trao quyền tự chủ kinh doanh (bắt đầu từ Khoán 10) đã
cho phép nông dân tiếp cận với đất đai và các tài nguyên khác như rừng, biển, mặt nước –
những yếu tố cơ bản của sản xuất nông nghiệp. Cùng với nó, chính sách tự do hoá thương
mại và đầu tư, đặc biệt đầu tư mạnh về thuỷ lợi đã tạo cú hích ban đầu cho nền nông nghiệp hàng hoá.
aused a fact that many of Vietnamese products had been excluded right at the beginning, narrowing the door for export of agricultural products. In fact, after 1 year of WTO accession, Vietnam’s agricultural products continued to sustain its market share. Moreover, besides the traditional markets, including China, ASEAN, Russia, East Europe, Vietnam has been able to penetrate the new and demanding markets such as the EU, Japan and the USA... By November 2007, Vietnam’s rice export turnover rose by 15% as against the same period, that of aquatic products up by 11.9%, coffee – up by 35.6%, and vegetables – up by 14.9%. In addition, many of Vietnam’s agricultural products gained benefits because of high export prices; for the first time, Vietnam’s export rice had the same (even higher) price with Thailand’s rice1. In 2007, Vietnam had 5 agricultural items whose export turnover surpassed the 1-million-USD export turnover/each, including: aquatic products (3.8 billion USD); wooden products (2.4 1 Department of Trade in Services, Ministry of Planning and Investment: Report on implementation of trade – services plan in 11 early months of 2007. 22 billion USD); coffee (1.86 billion USD); rice (1.46 billion USD); and rubber (1.4 billion USD)1. According to forecasts, Vietnam’s market and turnover of agricultural exports can be expanded. For the China market, for example, Vietnam’s agricultural exports to this market may increase from 400-500 million USD/year (present) to 700-800 million USD, with the leading export items as rubber, cashew nuts, manioc powder. For the US market, Vietnam’s agricultural exports to this market still occupied 0.4-0.5% market share, this is a very small number as compared with the potentiality. For the ASEAN market, Vietnam’s exports would be from 400-900 million USD/year, the main items of which is rice. Vietnam must quickly overcome the barriers of agricultural exports: improving export quality and competitiveness, improving the information channels; and well engaging in building trade-marks and marketing and promotion activities; fostering and expanding markets, consolidating the traditional markets, especially having strong breakthroughs in large and potential markets like the EU, Australia, Japan, the USA and Africa. These responsibilities and tasks can not be given only to enterprises – the individual manufacturers and processors, but to entire import-export system, the associations, the industries, and first and foremost the State, specializing ministries and national strategy planning organizations. The organizations, enterprises and Government as well need to have an active, flexible and professional coordination. In particular, the recent price fevers pointed out the very weak system of macro- management mechanisms and trade-related institutions, which are unable to catch up with requirements of international integration and modern market. For example, the high inflation and increased CPI in the recent time have created strong negative impacts on the poor rural households, because: the high prices of the group of food and foodstuff items – which account for 79% of the consumption structure of poor households. In addition, while the growth rate of output products was about 20-30%, that of input ones to serve agricultural production (such as fertilizers, pesticides, electricity, petrol, animal food...) went up much higher (40-50%). While the price of export rice was 1,000 USD/ton, the price paddy should have been 8,000 VND/kg, yet the buying price of paddy in the Mekong river delta was only 5,400 VND/kg. The profit, if available, was largely fallen into the pocket of the merchants (granary owners). Or the coffee growers gained only 1.5 USD out of 10 USD export value in the world market. In short, farmers were the ones who suffered the most and thus, unable to develop the agricultural sector strongly and sustainably. From this fact, we need to build and improve the macro-management institutions and well organize the market distribution mechanisms for sound implementation of import- export activities. In the paddy and rice sub-sector, there needs to improve the following 1 2007 sum-up conference on implementation of 2008 plan of the Agricultural sector in Hanoi, January 7th, 2008. 23 major organizations and institutions: i) Paddy farming households; ii) paddy and rice purchasing agencies; iii) cooperatives or associations of rice producers; iv) the State and rice import-export management offices. These organizations cooperate and control each other, in which the State is the centre (making the playing rules, managing, supervising and checking...). In context of highly increased rice price, there are opinions that the State should shift from quota-based management to import-export tax management, which will be better for rice producers and help stabilize the domestic rice market. 4. Providing effective support to farmers in accordance with WTO requirements It is obvious that farmers are the most vulnerable people in the market mechanism. That is because of the competitive nature of the market, where the strong will become stronger while the weak will become weaker. Yet, production and agricultural products are compulsory and indispensable to the society. Even in developed industrial countries, there require strong financial supports for assisting and protecting agriculture. In reality, these countries have built highly protected barriers and provide strong subsidies to their agricultural products, which as a consequence caused many difficulties and losses to agricultural products of countries like Vietnam when entering the foreign markets. For Vietnam, it seems that we have not paid adequate attention to subsidizing our agriculture and farmers. Entering the WTO, it is forecasted that Vietnam’s agriculture and rural development will be badly affected due to poor competitiveness and low-level production, as above-said. Though the Vietnam’s agriculture can sustain one year after WTO accession, but for the long run, the Vietnamese agriculture is in danger of unstable development, and the Vietnamese farmers may become worn-out in the whirl of integration. So, the State needs to have specific programs and roadmaps to support agriculture and farmers, so that they can not only confront with but also become stronger, quickly adaptive to the new conditions and global environment. It is certainly that the subsidies, if provided, must be following WTO rules (that is, they must belong to the green box and yellow box)1. At present, Vietnam’s subsidies to agriculture are very small, unable to create strong breakthroughs in rural development. It seems that we have fallen into an extreme: instead of seeking for supporting sources, we are worrying about what are prohibited by WTO. In fact, the WTO restricts only the subsidies that distort market prices and only when the exports of certain products cause serious losses to similar industry of an import country, they are imposed antagonistic taxes. The size and potentiality of Vietnam’s supports to agriculture remain very large; the point is to correctly define the key points, to provide sufficient and effective subsidies. The supporting sources should be socialized and diversified, with strict investigation and control, ensuring supports provided to right persons. 1 According to WTO rules, agricultural subsidies (except for export subsidies) can reach 10% GDP of the sector and, thus, Vietnam can spend not a small sum of money: 1.2 billion USD (compared with 12 billion USD of agricultural value) + 4,000 billion VND (from State budget) = 20,000 billion VND for subsidizing agriculture. Cited from online interview with ex-Minister of Trade Truong Dinh Tuyen, Vietnamnet dated 16 January 2008. 24 Attention should be paid to developing technical infrastructure and irrigation, expanding rural roads, providing training courses to improve people’s knowledge, making positive changes in the structure of rural labour; conducing studies, R&D activities, and applying scientific and technological achievements (new variety, techniques and new cultivation methods); providing subsidies for restructuring of agricultural production; financing environmental programs for assisting the difficulty-driven regions, supporting the direct producers... Subsidies should also be provided to narrow down the gap of living between the rural and urban areas, which can be done under the programs of “electricity, roads, schools and medical stations”. At present, this gap is tended to widen (which is about 2.6 times, compared with 3.6 times of China). In addition, the State subsidies should be defined as the factors to facilitate and promoting the efficiency of investments made by various economic actors in agriculture. Though agriculture continued to occupy a large ratio in national economic structure, the State’s investments into this sector represented only 14% of total National State budget investments. Investments from FDI enterprises in agriculture stayed at a modest rate, about 10.6% of total FDI investment projects and 6.5% of total FDI registered capital. In addition, the foreign investors in agriculture mainly come from Asia, not many from agricultural powers like the USA, Australia and Canada1. Investments in science and technology to serve agriculture are also very small, accounting for only 0.13% of GDP in this sector, while in other countries, the figure is about 4%2. If this ratio was doubled or one and a half higher, it would be very significant for the cause of agricultural and rural development in Vietnam. 1 Department of Planning, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Vietnamnet dated 22/12/2007. 2 WB (2007): World Development Report.
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